Slow and Ordinary Provability for Peano Arithmetic by Henk, Paula & Pakhomov, Fedor
ar
X
iv
:1
60
2.
01
82
2v
2 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  6
 Ju
n 2
01
6 Slow and Ordinary Provability for
Peano Arithmetic
Paula Henk∗ and Fedor Pakhomov†‡
2016
Abstract
The notion of slow provability for Peano Arithmetic (PA) was intro-
duced by S.-D. Friedman, M. Rathjen, and A. Weiermann. They stud-
ied the slow consistency statement Cons asserting that a contradiction
is not slow provable in PA. They showed that the logical strength of
the theory PA+Cons lies strictly between that of PA, and PA together
with its ordinary consistency: PA ( PA+Cons ( PA +ConPA.
This paper is a further investigation into slow provability and its
interplay with ordinary provability in PA. We study three variants of
slow provability. The associated consistency statement of each of these
yields a theory that lies strictly between PA and PA+ConPA in terms of
logical strength. We investigate Turing-Feferman progressions based
on these variants of slow provability. For our three notions, the Turing-
Feferman progression reaches PA + ConPA in a different numbers of
steps, namely ε0, ω, and 2. For each of the three slow provability
predicates, we also determine its joint provability logic with ordinary
PA-provability.
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1
1 Introduction
Slow provability, introduced by S.-D. Friedman, M. Rathjen, and A. Weier-
mann in [9], is a notion of nonstandard provability for Peano Arithmetic (PA)
– while we know that it coincides with ordinary provability for PA, this fact
is not verifiable in PA itself. This paper is a further investigation into the
relation between slow and ordinary provability, as seen from the perspective
of PA.
The definition of slow provability relies on a fast-growing hiearachy, also
known as the extended Grzegorczyk hieararchy. What we mean by this is,
following [9], an ordinal-indexed family of recursive functions {Fα}α≤ε0 . The
functions {Fα}α<ω are closely related to a family of classes of functions known
as the Grzegorczyk hierarchy ([12]). They are primitive recursive, and fur-
thermore every primitive recursive function is dominated by some function
in {Fα}α<ω. Lo¨b and Wainer ([16], [17]) extended the hierarchy into the
transfinite. The exact version of the fast-growing hierarchy used in [9] was
introduced by Solovay and Ketonen ([14]). The function Fε0 results from
diagonalizing over the functions {Fωn}n∈ω, each of which is provably total
in PA, and is not provably total in PA itself. This makes it interesting to
consider the following r.e. theory:
PA↾
Fε0
:= {IΣn | Fε0(n)↓} , (1)
where IΣn is as usual PA with the induction schema restricted to Σn-formulas.
Since Fε0 is total, we know that PA↾Fε0 and PA have exactly the same the-
orems. Arguing in PA, on the other hand, the totality of Fε0 cannot be
assumed, and thus PA↾
Fε0
might seem to be a weaker theory than PA. As
shown in [9], there exist indeed models of PA where a contradiction is provable
in PA but not in PA↾
Fε0
.
A notion of slow provability can be associated to any recursive function
f not provably total in PA, by considering the theory
PA↾
f
:= {IΣn | f(n)↓} . (2)
Since the equivalence of PA and PA↾
f
might not be verifiable in PA, it is
interesting to ask how exactly do the two theories relate to each other, as
seen from the perspective of PA. This paper offers some ways of answering
the above question.
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1.1 Results of this paper
Denote by ConPA, the usual consistency statement for PA, and by Conf the
statement expressing that a contradiction is not provable in PA↾
f
. As men-
tioned above, Conf need not be provably equivalent to ConPA. However it
is conceivable that by iterating Conf sufficiently many times, a statement
equivalent to ConPA is reached. We explore this possibility by considering
transfinite iterations of slow consistency statements. Given a non-zero or-
dinal α ≤ ε0, the α-iteration Con
α
f
of Conf is informally defined as the
consistency statement for the theory
PA↾
f
+ {Conβ
f
| 0 < β < α}. (3)
We adopt the provability logic approach to transfinite iterations, developing
the notion of a transfinite iteration Prα(x) of a provability predicate Pr(x)
along a Kalmar elementary well-ordering. We show that these iterations
satisfy the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions, and can thus be con-
sidered as provability predicates themselves (Section 4).
We show that the ε0-iteration of ConFε0 is equivalent to ConPA (Theorem
10), thus answering a question raised in [9, Remark 4.4]. We also show
that a small index shift in the definition of PA↾
Fε0
yields a slow consistency
statement whose ω-iteration is already equivalent to ConPA (Theorem 5).
While finishing writing this paper, the authors learned that the above results
are also contained in Anton Freunds recent paper [8]. The results of our paper
were obtained independently from the latter.
We also introduce a variant of slow provability that can be seen as the
square root of ordinary PA-provability, in the sense that already the two-fold
iteration of the associated slow consistency statement is equivalent to ConPA
(Theorem 12). Our slow provability variant is the first example of such a
provability predicate in the context of PA.
For each of our three notions of slow provability, we determine its joint
provability logic with ordinary PA-provability. While the slow provability
predicate studied in [9] and its shifted version mentioned above behave very
differently when it comes to transfinite iterations, their joint provability logic
with ordinary provability is the same, namely Lindstro¨m logic (Theorem
16). It was shown in [15] that the latter is also the joint provability logic of
ordinary and Parikh provability, which can be seen as a speeded up version
of ordinary PA-provability. Our proof or arithmetical completeness is rather
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general and works for a large class of pairs of provability predicates, including
ordinary and Parikh provability.
1.2 Overview of this paper
Sections 2 and 3 contain the basic results and notions used in the paper.
Section 4 introduces transfinite iterations of provability predicates. The no-
tion of slow provability, along with some results from [9], forms the content
of Section 5. In Section 6 we show that in some cases provability in PA im-
plies a certain transfinite iteration of slow provability. Section 7 deals with
the converse. The joint provability logic of slow and ordinary provability is
determined in Section 9. The material in this section relies only on sections
2 and 5.
1.3 History and context
We point out some developments related to the subject matter of this paper.
1.3.1 Nonstandard notions of provability for PA
The method of arithmetization developed by Go¨del allows PA to talk about
basic syntactical notions. In particular, there is an arithmetical formula
PrPA(x), the so-called provability predicate, that expresses basic facts about
provability in PA. Writing ConPA for the sentence ¬PrPA(⊥), Go¨del’s Second
Incompleteness Theorem states that ConPA is not provable in PA.
Since PrPA(x) is, prima facie, an arithmetical formula, one may justifiably
ask what exactly is meant by calling it a provability predicate. Could there
be another provability predicate whose associated consistency statement is
provable in PA? Likewise, which properties of PrPA(x) does the proof of the
Second Incompleteness Theorem rely on?
Such questions were for the first time investigated by Feferman in his
influential paper [5]. He constructs a predicate Pr∗PA(x) that has the same
extension as PrPA(x) on the natural numbers, whose associated consistency
statement is however provable in PA. The existence of such a nonstandard
provability predicate illustrates the need for a more careful formulation of the
Second Incompleteness Theorem.
In order to demonstrate the difficulty of singling out one “standard” prov-
ability predicate for PA, Feferman ([5, Theorem 7.4, 7.5]) provides a rather
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general method for modifying a given provability predicate Pr(x), so as to ob-
tain new provability predicates Pr′(x) and Pr′′(x) for the same theory, whose
associated consistency statements lie strictly below and above the original
one respectively:
PA ( PA+ Con′ ( PA+ Con ( PA+ Con′′. (4)
In particular, we obtain a theory lying between PA and PA+ConPA in terms of
logical strength. Since the above method relies on self-reference, in the form
of a Rosser-style construction, it is reasonable to ask whether a natural theory
with this property can also be found. The theory PA+ ConFε0 , obtained by
adding to PA the statement of its slow consistency, may be seen as the first
example of such a theory.
Another example of nonstandard provability is the so-called Parikh prov-
ability. An arithmetical sentence ϕ is said to be Parikh provable if it is
provable in PA together with Parkih’s rule, where the latter allows one to
infer ϕ from the sentence PrPA(ϕ). Since Parikh’s rule is admissible in PA,
adding it to PA does not yield new theorems. As shown in [18], it does
yield speed-up, meaning that some theorems have much shorter proofs when
Parikh’s rule is allowed. The equivalence of Parikh provability and ordinary
provability is however not verifiable in PA.
1.3.2 Slow provability for weak theories
A notion of slow provability in the context of Kalmar Elementary Arithmetic
(EA) was introduced by Visser in [27]. He uses a superexponential (not
provably total in EA) function in order to modify the standard provability
predicate of EA. As in the case of slow provability for PA, the associated slow
consistency statement lies strictly between EA and EA + ConEA in terms of
logical strength.
A version of square root provability for I∆0+Exp was also found by Visser:
it is shown in [26] that cut-free or tableaux provability serve as the square
root of ordinary provability in the context of I∆0+Exp.
1.3.3 Provability logic
The idea of viewing PrPA(x) as a modal operator  goes back to Go¨del ([11]).
Hilbert and Bernays formulated certain conditions for PrPA(x) that would
suffice for the proof of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. These were
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later simplified by Lo¨b, and are now referred to as the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b
derivability conditions :
1. PA ⊢ ϕ⇒ PA ⊢ ϕ
2. PA ⊢ (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
3. PA ⊢ ϕ→ ϕ
The system GL of propositional modal logic is axiomatized by adding to the
basic modal logic K the following, known as Lo¨b’s axiom: (A → A) →
A. It was proven by Solovay ([23]) that GL is the provability logic of PA:
its theorems are exactly the propositional schemata involving PrPA(x) that
are provable in PA.
Solovay’s method has been used to apply modal logic to study other
metamathematical predicates besides PrPA(x). Shavrukov ([22]) determined
the joint provability logic of ordinary and Feferman provability Pr∗PA(x). The
joint provability logic of ordinary and Parikh provability was established by
Lindstro¨m ([15]).
1.3.4 Turing-Feferman progressions
The idea of transfinite iterations of consistency statements goes back to Tur-
ing ([25]). Given a sufficiently strong Σ1-sound theory T, consider the se-
quence of theories given by: T0 := T, and Tn+1 := Tn + ConTn for all n. It
follows from the Second Incompleteness Theorem that each Tn+1 is a strictly
stronger theory than Tn. In his doctoral thesis [25], Turing introduced the
method of transfinite iterations, allowing one to extend the above sequence
into the transfinite. Given a theory T and an ordinal α, the theory Tα is
informally defined as:
Tα = T+ Con(
⋃
β<α
Tβ). (5)
Returning to transfinite iterations of consistency statements introduced in-
formally in (3) above, we note that using the notation of (5), we have that
for α > 0, PA↾
f
+ Conα
f
is the theory (PA↾
f
)α.
A proper construction of the above sequence of theories requires a re-
cursive ordinal notation system. As shown in [25, 6], the properties of Tα
for infinite α depend significantly on the choice of the ordinal notation sys-
tem. These difficulties will not influence our paper, however, as we shall only
6
consider ordinals α ≤ ε0, identifying any such α with its representation in
Cantor normal form.
2 Arithmetical theories
We consider first-order theories formulated in the language L of arithmetic
containing 0, S (successor), +, ×, and ≤. As usual, an L-formula is said to be
∆0 (equivalently: Σ0 or Π0) if all its quantifiers are bounded, and Σn+1(Πn+1)
if it is of the form ∃x0 . . . xn ϕ, with ϕ a Πn(Σn)-formula. We write n for the
L-term corresponding to n, i.e. 0 followed by n applications of S. Given this,
we shall mostly write n instead of n.
The basic facts concerning 0, S, +, ×, and ≤ are given by the axioms of
the theory Q of Robinson Arithmetic ([13, Definition I.1.1]). The theory Q
is Σ1-complete, meaning that it proves every true Σ1-sentence.
Our main interest in this article is the theory PA of Peano Arithmetic
that results from adding to Q the induction schema for all arithmetical for-
mulas. As usual, IΣn denotes the fragment of PA obtained by restricting
the induction schema to Σn-formulas. Clearly, IΣn ⊆ IΣn+1 for all n, and
PA =
⋃
n∈ω IΣn. We shall therefore sometimes also write IΣω for PA. Using
that satisfaction for Σn-formulas is definable in IΣ1 by a Σn-formula, one can
show that for all n > 0, IΣn is finitely axiomatisable ([13, Theorem I.2.52],
see also Section 2.2 below).
As our metatheory, we mostly use I∆0+Exp. In order to introduce the
latter, we recall that there is a ∆0-formula ϕe(x, y, z) that defines, provably in
I∆0, the graph of a recursively defined exponentiation function e(x, y) = x
y
([13, Theorem V.3.15]), i.e. we have:
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ϕe(x, 0, z)↔ z = 1
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ϕe(x, y + 1, z)↔ ∃w (E(x, y, w) ∧ z = w · x)
The sentence stating the totality of this function:
∀x∀y∃!z ϕe(x, y, z) (6)
is not provable in I∆0. The theory I∆0+Exp is the result from adding (6) as
an additional axiom to I∆0. We recall that I∆0+Exp is finitely axiomatizable
([13, Theorem V.5.6 ]).
Since the formula defining exponentiation in I∆0 is ∆0, I∆0+Exp is a
conservative extension of Elementary Arithmetic (EA). By EA, we mean the
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theory formulated in the language of arithmetic, together with a function
symbol exp for exponentiation. It contains the basic facts concerning 0, S,
+, ×, ≤ and exp, plus induction for all ∆0-formulas of the extended language.
EA is strong enough to formalize almost all of finitary mathematics outside
logic.
2.1 Representing recursive functions in I∆0+Exp
It is well-known that a coding of sequences can be carried out inside I∆0+Exp.
Using that, it is straightforward to show that every primitive recursive rela-
tion R can be represented inside I∆0+Exp by a Σ1-formula ϕR, in the sense
that for all n0, . . . , nk,
(n0, . . . , nk) ∈ R iff I∆0+Exp ⊢ ϕR(n0, . . . , nk). (7)
We recall that there are primitive recursive functions T and U with the
property that for all recursive f, there exists some e, such that for all n,
f(n) = U (µy T (e, n, y)) . (8)
Thus we can associate to any recursive function f a Σ1-formula ϕf that defines
f in a natural way, say by mimicking its definition in (8). If f is k-ary, then
for all n1, . . . , nk, we have that
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ϕf(n1, . . . , nk, f(n1, . . . , nk)) (9)
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∃!z ϕf(n1, . . . , nk, z) (10)
Since I∆0+Exp is Σ1-sound, it follows that for any recursively enumerable
(r.e.) set A, there is a Σ1-formula ϕA such that for all n, n ∈ A if and only
if I∆0+Exp ⊢ ϕA(n). In fact, as was first shown in [4], given any extension
S of I∆0+Exp and any r.e. set A, there is a Σ1-formula ϕA such that for all
n, n ∈ A if and only if S ⊢ ϕA(n).
Given a k-ary recursive function f, we denote by f(x1, . . . , xk)↓ the for-
mula ∃y ϕf(x1, . . . , xk, y), and say that f converges on input x1, . . . , xk. Sim-
ilarly, we denote by f(x1, . . . , xk)↑ the formula ¬f(x1, . . . , xk)↓, and say that
f diverges on input x1, . . . , xn. We use f↓ as shorthand for
∀x1 . . . xk f(x1, . . . , xk)↓,
and f↑ as shorthand for ¬f↓.
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A recursive function f is said to be provably recursive in a theory S ⊇
I∆0+Exp if S ⊢ f↓. The provably recursive functions of I∆0+Exp are exactly
the Kalmar elementary functions. The class of Kalmar elementary functions
is the smallest class containing successor, zero, projection, addition, mul-
tiplication, substraction, and closed under composition as well as bounded
sums and bounded products ([20]). For a characterization of the provably
recursive functions of IΣn for n ≥ 1, see Theorem 3 in Section 3 below.
2.2 Metamathematics in I∆0+Exp
It is well-known that arithmetization of syntax can be carried out in I∆0+Exp.
We assume as given some standard go¨delnumbering of L-formulas, and write
pϕq for the go¨delnumber of ϕ. We shall often identify a formula with its
go¨delnumber, writing ψ(ϕ) instead of ψ(pϕq).
Let S be a r.e. extension of I∆0+Exp. As explained in Section 2.1, the
set of axioms of S can be represented in I∆0+Exp by a Σ1-formula ϕS. Using
the latter, one can define in a natural way a Σ1-formula PrϕS(x) representing
provability in S inside I∆0+Exp ([5, Definition 4.1]). In this paper, we shall
write PrS instead of PrϕS, having in mind some formula ϕS representing
the axioms of S in I∆0+Exp in a natural way, by mimicking their informal
definition. We refer to PrS as the standard provability predicate of S.
We employ modal notation, writing S instead of PrS. We write 0 as
shorthand for I∆0+Exp. By x we denote the formula containing x as a free
variable, and such that for n > 0, n (the result of substituting n for x in
x) is IΣn . We write , or sometimes also ω, for PA. We write ✸Sϕ as
shorthand for ¬S¬ϕ.
We recall that PA is essentially reflexive, meaning that it proves the consis-
tency of each of its finite subtheories, and the same holds for every consistent
extension of PA in the language of arithmetic ([13, Theorem III.2.35]).
We use the dot notation as usual, thus Sϕ(x˙) means that the numeral for
the value of x has been substituted for the free variable of the formula ϕ inside
S. If the intended meaning is clear from the context, we will often simply
write Sϕ(x) instead of Sϕ(x˙). We recall that any theory S extending
I∆0+Exp is provably Σ1-complete, meaning that for any Σ1-formula σ,
I∆0+Exp ⊢ σ(x)→ Sσ(x˙).
It is well-known that if S is as above, then the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivabil-
ity conditions hold for S verifiably in I∆0+Exp:
9
1. if S ⊢ ϕ, then I∆0+Exp ⊢ Sϕ
2. I∆0+Exp ⊢ S(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Sϕ→ Sψ)
3. I∆0+Exp ⊢ Sϕ→ SSϕ
We note that 2 and 3 also hold with internal variables ranging over ϕ and ψ.
Theorem 1. Let ϕ be an L-formula whose free variables are exactly x0, . . . , xn.
Then there is an L-formula ψ with exactly the same free variables, and such
that
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ψ (x1, . . . , xn)↔ ϕ (pψq, x1, . . . , xn) . (11)
From the proof of Theorem 1 it is clear that if ϕ is Σn(Πn), then so is ψ.
Verifiability of Lo¨b’s principle forS in I∆0+Exp follows from the Hilbert-
Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions for S, together with Theorem 1 ([2,
Theorem 3.2]). This means that
I∆0+Exp ⊢ S(Sϕ→ ϕ)→ Sϕ, (12)
and thus modal principles valid in the Go¨del-Lo¨b provability logic GL can be
used when reasoning about S in I∆0+Exp.
For n ≥ 1, there is a partial truth definition TrueΠn(x) (TrueΣn(x)) in
I∆0+Exp for the class Πn (Σn) [13, V.5(b)]. Thus for every ϕ ∈ Πn (ϕ ∈ Σn)
we have
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ϕ↔ TrueΠn(ϕ) (I∆0+Exp ⊢ ϕ↔ TrueΣn(ϕ)).
Moreover, TrueΠn(x) and TrueΣn(x) satisfy Tarski’s conditions (see [13, Def-
inition I.1.74]). For all n ≥ 1, TrueΠn(x) is a Πn-formula, and TrueΣn(x) is a
Σn-formula.
Suppose α ∈ [1, ω] and n ≥ 1. Byn α we denote the provability predicate
for the theory IΣα extended by all true Πn sentences. We formalize n αϕ in
a natural way using a partial truth definition:
∃ψ ∈ Πn-Sen(TrueΠn(ψ) ∧α(ψ → ϕ)),
where Πn-Sen denotes the set of all Go¨del numbers of Πn-sentences. Here we
can have quantifiers over α but not over n in the language of arithmetic. We
use ✸n α to denote the dual of n α, i.e. ✸n αϕ := ¬n α¬ϕ. The sentence ✸n αϕ
is equivalent to uniform Πn+1-reflection for IΣα + ϕ, i.e. the principle saying
that if for some Πn+1-formula ψ(x) and every m the theory IΣα + ϕ proves
ψ(m), then ∀xψ(x) is true.
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3 Ordinals and the fast-growing hierarchy
We introduce a certain fast-growing hierarchy of recursive functions indexed
by ordinals below ε0. We recall the basic facts concerning this hierarchy,
including a characterization of the provably recursive functions of IΣn, for
n > 0.
In order to define the fast-growing functions, and to talk about them in
our arithmetical theories, we need to represent ordinals below ε0 as natural
numbers. For that, it is useful to recall the Cantor normal form theorem:
Theorem 2. For every ordinal α > 0, there exist unique α0 ≥ α1 ≥ . . . ≥ αk
with
α = ωα0 + ωα1 + . . .+ ωαk .
The above representation of α is called its Cantor normal form. Since ε0
is the least ordinal ε for which it holds that ε = ωε, we see that if α < ε0, then
α has a Cantor normal form with exponents αi < α, and these exponents in
turn have Cantor normal form with yet smaller exponents. We represent an
ordinal α below ε0 by either the symbol 0 if α = 0, or otherwise its Cantor
normal form
ωα0 + ωα1 + . . .+ ωαk ,
where each αi is represented in the same way. More formally, this means
that for any ordinal below ε0, we fix a term built ω
x, x + y, and 0. This
method, known as Cantor ordinal notation system, is the most common way
of representing ordinals below ε0.
In order to work with the above terms in arithmetic, we represent them
as their Go¨del numbers. We note that the predicate < and the standard
functions of ordinal arithmetic (x+y, x·y and ωx) on Cantor ordinal notations
can be expressed in the language of arithmetic. Basic facts about ordinal
arithmetic can be easily proven in I∆0+Exp ([24, Section 3]); we will omit
the details of this formalization in our proofs.
3.1 The fast-growing hierarchy
For an ordinal number α and n < ω, we define ωαn by ω
α
0 := α, and ω
α
n+1 =
ωω
α
n . We write ωn for ω
1
n. Thus ω0 = 1, ω1 = ω, ω2 = ω
ω, etc. It is well-
known that the ordinal ε0 can also be characterized as sup{ωn | n ∈ ω}; we
therefore define ωω := ε0.
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A fundamental sequence for a countable limit ordinal λ is a strictly mono-
tone sequence {λ[n]}n∈ω converging to λ from below, i.e. λ[n] < λ[n+1] < λ
for all n < ω, and sup{λ[n] | n ∈ ω} = λ. We consider the standard assign-
ment of fundamental sequences to limit ordinals below ε0.
Definition 1. Let ε0[n] := ωn+1. For a limit ordinal λ < ε0 with Cantor
normal form λ = ωα0 + ωα1 + . . .+ ωαk , we define λ[n] as follows:
• If αk is a successor ordinal, let λ[n] := ω
α0 +ωα1 + . . .+ω(αk−1) · (n+1)
• if αk is a limit ordinal, let λ[n] := ω
α0 + ωα1 + . . .+ ωαk[n]
Given a function F : N → N, we use exponential notation to denote
repeated compositions of F, thus F0(x) = x, and Fn+1(x) = F(Fn(x)).
Definition 2. The fast-growing hierarchy {Fα}α≤ε0 of recursive functions is
given by:
F0(n) = n+ 1
Fα+1(n) = F
n+1
α (n)
Fλ(n) = Fλ[n](n)
This exact version of the fast-growing hierarchy was first introduced by
Solovay and Ketonen in [14]. Their results, together with results of Paris in
[19], imply the following classification of the provably recursive functions of
PA:
Theorem 3. For n > 0, IΣn ⊢ Fα↓ ⇔ α < ωn.
The computation of Fα(n) is closely connected to the following stepdown
relation on ordinals.
Definition 3. For any ordinals α, β ≤ ε0 and numbers n, r we write α
r
−→
n
β
if there exists a sequence γ0, . . . , γr such that γ0 = α, γr = β, and for all
0 ≤ i < r, γi+1 = γi[n] if γi is a limit ordinal and γi+1 + 1 = γi, otherwise.
We write α −→
n
β in case α
r
−→
n
β for some r.
Lemma 1 (I∆0+Exp). [9, Lemma 2.3, Lemma 2.4]
1. If α −→
n
β and Fα(n)↓ then Fβ(n)↓ and Fα(n) ≥ Fβ(n).
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2. If Fα(n)↓ and n > m, then Fα(m)↓ and Fα(n) ≥ Fα(m).
3. If α > β and Fα↓ then Fβ↓.
4. If i > 0 and Fiα(n)↓ then n < F
i
α(n).
5. If Fα(n)↓ then α −→
n
0.
Lemma 2 (PA). [9, Lemma 2.10] Suppose α, β < ε0, n is a number, ω
α −→
n
0,
and α −→
n
β. Then ωα −→
n
ωβ.
Lemma 3 (PA). For all numbers k, n, and s if ωk+1n −→
s
0 then ωk+1n −→
s
ωkn.
Lemma 4 (PA). For all numbers k, n, and s ≥ 1 if ωk+1n −→
s
0 then
ωk+1n −→
s
ωkn + 1.
Proof. By the Lemma 3, we have ωk+1n −→
s
ωkn. We show that on the step
before ωkn on the −→
s
-path from ωk+1n to ω
k
n, we have ω
k
n + 1 and hence the
lemma holds. Case consideration shows that there are at most two possible
α-s such that α
1
−→
s
ωkn: the ordinal α = ω
k
n + 1 and the ordinal α = ωn+1, if
s+1 = k. But because ωn+1 > ω
k+1
n , any
1
−→
s
-chain from ωk+1n to ω
k
n should
go through ωkn + 1. Hence ω
k+1
n −→
s
ωkn + 1. ⊠
Lemma 5 (PA). For all numbers k, n, and m ≤ n if ωk+1n −→
k
0 then
ωk+1n −→
k
ωk+1m .
Proof. From the definition of −→
k
it follows that k + 1 −→
k
1. Thus from
Lemma 2 it follows that ωk+1 −→
k
ω. We have ω −→
k
k + 1. Hence ωk+1 −→
k
k+1. Now we use the latter and Lemma 2 to prove the lemma by induction
on n. ⊠
Lemma 6 (PA). If m ≤ n, α −→
m
β, and Fα(n)↓ then Fβ(n)↓ and Fα(n) ≥
Fβ(n).
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Proof. Using Lemma 1 it is sufficient to show that α −→
n
β. Consider the
only sequnce γ0, . . . , γr such that γ0 = α, γr = β, and γi
1
−→
m
γi+1, for all
i < r. We show by induction on i that for any i < r we have γi −→
n
γi+1 and
Fγi+1(n)↓. We first show that γi −→
n
γi+1, assuming that Fγi(n)↓ (we have it
either from induction assumption or if i = 0 we have it because Fα(n)↓). We
consider two cases: γi is a limit ordinal and γi is a successor ordinal. The
case of successor ordinal is trivial. If γi is a limit ordinal then from Fγi(n)↓
it follows that Fγi[n](n)↓ and thus by Lemma 1 we have γi[n] −→
n
0. By [9,
Proposition 2.12] we have γi[n] −→
n
γi[m] = γi+1. Hence γi −→
n
γi+1. Now
from Lemma 1 it follows that Fγi+1↓(n). This finishes our inductive proof.
Since we have γi −→
n
γi+1, for any i < r, we clearly have γ0 −→
n
γr, i.e.
α −→
n
β. ⊠
3.2 Transfinite induction
Using the representation of ordinals in PA, we can formulate the schema of
transfinite induction. For an ordinal α ≤ ε0 and a number n ≥ 0, we write
TIΠn-α for the following schema:
∀β < α (∀ γ < β ϕ(γ)→ ϕ(β))→ ∀γ < αϕ(γ), (13)
where ϕ is a Πn-formula. Since there is a Πn-partial truth definition TrueΠn
in I∆0+Exp (see Section 2.2), there is an instance of the schema that implies
all other instances of it in I∆0+Exp. We can thus identify TIΠn-α with this
instance, and consider TIΠn-α to be a single formula.
It follows from Gentzen’s work in [10] that PA proves TIΠn-α for all n and
α < ε0, and that it does not prove TIΠ0-ε0. For a treatment of the amount
of transfinite induction available in the fragments IΣn of PA, see for example
[24].
Suppose we argue in PA, and want to show that a certain property ϕ
holds for all ordinals less than some α < ε0. By the above, it suffices to show
that
∀β < α (∀ γ < β ϕ(γ)→ ϕ(β)) . (14)
A formula ϕ for which (14) holds will be called progressive. We note that for
any α ≤ ε0, IΣ1 verifies that the formula Fα↓ is progressive, i.e. that
∀γ < β Fγ↓ → Fβ↓. (15)
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To see that (15) holds, note that by Definition 2, the following are verifiable
in IΣ1:
1. F0↓
2. ∀α (Fα↓ → Fα+1↓)
3. ∀λ ≤ ε0 (λ ∈ Lim → (∀α < λ Fα↓ → Fλ↓))
Thus whether a function Fα (for some α ≤ ε0) is provably total in some
extension T of IΣn depends on the amount of transfinite induction available
in T.
4 Transfinite iterations of provability predi-
cates
In the present section we will give precise definitions of transfinite iterations
of provability predicates and their duals. These notions are closely related
to Turing-Feferman progressions [25, 6]. Our presentation of this subject is
based on the approach from [1] which itself is based on [21].
Definition 4. We say that (D,≺) is an elementary linear ordering if D is
a subset of the natural numbers, for both D and ≺ there are fixed bounded
formulas of the language of EA that define them, and EA proves that (D,≺)
is a linear ordering.
Note, that for any elementary well-ordering (D,≺) there are Σ1 formu-
las of the language of first-order arihmetic L that are equivalent in EA to
the standard defining formulas for D and ≺. Because EA is a conserva-
tive extension of I∆0+Exp, the choice of the formulas above is unique up to
I∆0+Exp-provable equivalence. Thus we can freely talk about provability of
facts about an elementary well ordering within theories containing I∆0+Exp.
We will define transfinite iterations of provability predicates. Reflexive
induction is an important method of reasoning about such iterations.
Lemma 7. [1, Lemma 2.4][21] For any elementary linear ordering (D,≺),
any theory T extending I∆0+Exp is closed under the following reflexive in-
duction rule:
∀α ∈ D (T∀β ≺ αF(β)→ F(α))
∀α ∈ DF(α)
.
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Proof. Suppose T ⊢ ∀α ∈ D ((T∀β ≺ αF(β))→ F(α)). Then the sentence
with stronger assumption is also derivable:
T ⊢ ∀α ∈ D ((T∀β ∈ DF(β))→ F(α)).
We can also weaken the conclusion:
T ⊢ T∀α ∈ D F(α)→ ∀α ∈ DF(α).
Therefore by Lo¨b’s theorem we have
T ⊢ ∀α ∈ DF(α). ⊠
We fix for the rest of the section a Σ1-provability predicate △ for an
arithmetical theory T containing I∆0+Exp that satisfies Hilbert-Bernays-
Lo¨b derivability conditions verifiably in I∆0+Exp. We denote by ▽ the
dual consistency predicate for △. Also, we fix an elementary linear ordering
(D,≺) such that the least element of (D,≺) is 0D and the fact that 0D is
the least element of (D,≺) is verifiable I∆0+Exp.
We define iterations of △ along (D,≺): △αϕ, where α ∈ D and ϕ is an
arithmetical sentence. An iteration △xy is an arithmetical formula with two
free variables such that
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∀ϕ∀α ∈ D \ {0
D} (△αϕ↔ ∃β ≺ α△△βϕ).
Here and below, if we refer to Go¨del numbers of iterations, we could also use
zero times iterations. We define △0
D
ϕ to be equal to ϕ, i.e. more formally,
△△βϕ should be written as
(β = 0D → △ϕ) ∧ (β 6= 0D →△△βϕ).
Existence of iterations follows from the Diagonal Lemma (Theorem 1).
Simple inspection of the last argument shows that the resulting formula is
Σ1. Actually any two iterations are I∆0+Exp-provably equivalent (this fact
resembles uniqueness of smooth progressions [1]).
Lemma 8. For any two iterations (△xy)1 and (△
xy)2 of △ along (D,≺) we
have
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∀α ∈ D \ {0
D} ∀ϕ((△αϕ)1 ↔ (△
αϕ)2)). (16)
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Proof. We use reflexive induction to prove it. We need to show that
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∀α ∈ D \ {0
D} (0∀β ≺ α∀ϕ((△
βϕ)1 ↔ (△
βϕ)2)→
∀ϕ((△αϕ)1 ↔ (△
αϕ)2)).
(17)
By definition of an iteration the latter will follow from
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∀α ∈ D \ {0
D} (0∀β ≺ α∀ϕ((△
βϕ)1 ↔ (△
βϕ)2)→
∀ϕ(∃β ≺ α△(△βϕ)1 ↔ ∃β ≺ α△(△
βϕ)2)).
(18)
Because there is a symmetry between (△xy)1 and (△
xy)2, it is enough to
show that
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∀α ∈ D \ {0
D} (0∀β ≺ α∀ϕ((△
βϕ)1 → (△
βϕ)2)→
∀ϕ(∃β ≺ α△(△βϕ)1 → ∃β ≺ α△(△
βϕ)2)).
(19)
Clearly, we have
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∀α ∈ D \ {0
D} (0∀β ≺ α∀ϕ((△
βϕ)1 → (△
βϕ)2)→
∀β ≺ α∀ϕ0((△
βϕ)1 → (△
βϕ)2)).
(20)
Because T contains I∆0+Exp we have
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∀ϕ∀β ∈ D \ {0
D}(0((△
βϕ)1 → (△
βϕ)2)
→△((△βϕ)1 → (△
βϕ)2)).
Thus
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∀ϕ∀β ∈ D \ {0
D}(0((△
βϕ)1 → (△
βϕ)2)
→ (△(△βϕ)1 →△(△
βϕ)2)).
Hence (19) holds and we have (16). ⊠
In the same fashion as iterations of △ we define the dual notion of itera-
tions ▽
x
y of ▽. ▽
x
y is an arithmetical formula with two free variables such
that
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∀ϕ∀α ∈ D \ {0
D} (▽
α
ϕ↔ ∀β ≺ α(▽▽
β
ϕ)).
Existence of iterations ▽
x
y again follows from Diagonal Lemma.
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Lemma 9. For any two iterations (▽
x
y)1 and (▽
x
y)2 of ▽ along (D,≺) we
have
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∀α ∈ D \ {0
D} ∀ϕ((▽
α
ϕ)1 ↔ (▽
α
ϕ)2)). (21)
Proof. Can be proved in the same fashion as Lemma 8. ⊠
Because we have existence and uniqueness (up to provable equivalence),
we use iterations △αϕ and ▽
α
ϕ freely, without specifing explicit formulas.
Let us denote by SuccD(α, β) the formula
α ∈ D ∧ β ∈ D ∧ α ≺ β ∧ ∀γ ∈ D¬(α ≺ γ ∧ γ ≺ β).
Let us denote by Dlim the set of all α ∈ D such that
α 6= 0D ∧ ∀β ∈ D ¬SuccD(β, α).
Lemma 10 (I∆0+Exp). The following properties of iterations of △ and ▽
hold:
1. ∀ϕ∀α ∈ D \ {0D} (¬△α¬ϕ↔▽
α
ϕ);
2. ∀ϕ∀α ∈ D \ {0D} (△ϕ→△αϕ);
3. ∀ϕ∀α, β ∈ D \ {0D} (α ≺ β → (△αϕ→ △βϕ));
4. ∀α ∈ D \ {0D} ∀ϕ, ψ(△α(ϕ→ ψ)→ (△αϕ→ △αψ));
5. ∀α ∈ D \ {0D} ∀ϕ ∈ Σ1-Sen(TrueΣ1(ϕ)→ △
αϕ);
6. ∀α ∈ D \ {0D} ∀ϕ(△αϕ→△α△αϕ);
7. ∀α ∈ D \ {0D} ∀β(SuccD(β, α)→ ∀ϕ(△
αϕ↔△△βϕ));
8. ∀α ∈ Dlim ∀ϕ(△αϕ↔ ∃β ≺ α(β ∈ D \ {0D} ∧ △βϕ)).
Proof. The proof of items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 is straightforward by using reflexive
induction. Item 6 follows from item 5. We prove item 7 using item 3 and we
prove item 8 using items 7 and 3. ⊠
Lemma 10 gives us a number of facts about iterations of provability pred-
icates and their duals. We will frequently use them below without explicitely
refering to them.
Note that items 2, 4, 6 of Lemma 10 yield I∆0+Exp-verifiable Hilbert-
Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions for each △α. The latter with Lemma 10
item 1 means that each ▽
α
is dual for the provability predicate △α.
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Lemma 11. Suppose T is an arithmetical theory such that I∆0+Exp ⊆ T, △1
and △2 are Σ1 provability predicates that satisfy I∆0+Exp-verifiable Hilbert-
Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions, and T ⊢ ∀ϕ (△1ϕ→△2ϕ). Then
T ⊢ ∀α ∈ D \ {0D} ∀ϕ (△α1ϕ→△
α
2ϕ).
Proof. By reflexive induction. ⊠
For the rest of the section we assume that (D,≺) is Cantor ordinal nota-
tions for the ordinals ≤ ε0 as defined in Section 3.
Lemma 12 (I∆0+Exp). ∀α ≥ 1∀β ≤ ε0∀ϕ (△
α△βϕ↔△β+αϕ)
Proof. By reflexive induction on α. ⊠
5 Slow provability
Suppose that the theory S is given by a uniform r.e. enumeration {Sn}n∈ω.
We can use any (partial) recursive function f to “slow down” provability in
S, by considering the theory
S↾
f
:= I∆0+Exp ∪
⋃
{Sn | f(n)↓}. (22)
The reason for adding I∆0+Exp is to ensure that all our theories exhibit a
minimal amount of nice behaviour (see Section 2). From the definition, it
is clear that S↾
f
is a r.e. subtheory of S. If f is total, then S↾
f
has exactly
the same theorems as S. However this fact may not be verifiable in a theory
where f is not provably total.
Since {Sn}n∈ω is uniformly r.e., there is an arithmetical formula Sx ,
containing x as a free variable, such that Sn is the provability predicate of
Sn. We assume that, verifiably in I∆0+Exp, Sϕ is provably equivalent to
∃xSxϕ. The provability predicate Sx,f of S↾f can be defined in a natural
way:
Definition 5. The provability predicate Sx,f of S↾f is defined as
Sx,f ϕ := 0ϕ ∨ ∃y ≤ x
(
Syϕ ∧ f(x)↓
)
.
If {Sn}n∈ω is {IΣn}n∈ω, we write f instead of Sx,f.
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If f is total but not provably total in T, then from the point of view of T
the formula Sx,f is a nonstandard provability predicate for S. On the other
hand, Sx,f is a standard Σ1-provability predicate for the r.e. theory S↾f. It
therefore satisfies the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions verifiably
in I∆0+Exp (Section 2.2).
With Definition 5, the usual provability predicate for PA can be written
as f, where f is any Kalmar elementary function (assuming I∆0+Exp as
our metatheory). It is easy to see that for any f, fϕ is provably equivalent
in I∆0+Exp to the formula:
∃x (xϕ ∧ f(n)↓). (23)
We recall the slow provability predicate studied in [9], defined as:
∃x (xϕ ∧ Fε0(x)↓) . (24)
We define, for z ∈ Z,
F
(z)
ε0
(x) := Fε0(x
.− z), (25)
and consider the provability predicates 
F
(z)
ε0
. For the sake of readability, we
let
⊡z ϕ := 
F
(z)
ε0
ϕ. (26)
Thus the provability predicate in (24) becomes ⊡0.
Remark 1. For any z, we can define a “shifted” enumeration {Tzn}n∈ω of
PA, such that ⊡z is provably equivalent to Tzx,Fε0 , by simply defining T
z
x as
IΣx+z.
In [9], Theorem 4 below is proven for ⊡0. In order to consider the more
general case, we need one more definition.
Definition 6. We say that {Sn}n∈ω is a recursive sequence of finitely axiom-
atizable theories if there is a recursive sequence {Sn-Ax}n∈ω such that for all
n, Sn is axiomatized by Sn-Ax, and Sn-Ax is finite.
Theorem 4. Suppose Sn is a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable
theories such that PA proves that PA =
⋃
n∈ω
Sn. Let △ denote the provability
predicate Sx,Fε0 . Then PA ⊢ ∀ϕ (△ϕ→ ϕ).
Proof. Essentially the same as [9, Theorem 4.1]. See also Theorem 11 in
Section 7 below. ⊠
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It follows that, from the point of view of PA, any provability predicate △
as in the statement of Theorem 4 defines in fact a weaker theory than :
Corollary 13. Suppose Sn is a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable
theories such that PA proves that PA =
⋃
n∈ω
Sn. Let △ denote the provability
predicate Sx,Fε0 . Then PA 0 ⊥ → △⊥.
Proof. Suppose that PA ⊢ ⊥ → △⊥. Since △ϕ implies ϕ for all ϕ, we
have
PA ⊢ △△⊥→ △⊥, (27)
whence by Theorem 4,
PA ⊢ △△⊥→ ⊥. (28)
Combining this with our assumption yields PA ⊢ △△⊥ → △⊥. By Lo¨b’s
Theorem for △ (this follows from the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability con-
ditions for △), we now have that PA ⊢ △⊥ whence also PA ⊢ ⊥, contra-
diction. ⊠
Theorem 4 holds for a rather wide class of provability predicates △. In
Section 9 below, we determine the joint provability logic of any such △ and
ordinary PA-provability. In contrast, the following sections provide examples
of properties where the exact axiomatization of slow provability leads to a
radical difference in the behaviour of the corresponding provability predi-
cates. In particular, we show that
PA ⊢ ⊡ε01 ϕ↔ ϕ, (29)
whereas
PA ⊢ ⊡ω2 ϕ↔ ϕ, (30)
where ⊡αz denotes the α-iteration of ⊡z (see Section 4). In Section 8, we shall
furthermore show that there is a function r such that
PA ⊢ rrϕ↔ ϕ. (31)
Thus the slow provability predicates ⊡1, ⊡2, and r may be seen as the
ε0-root, the ω-root, and the square root of ordinary provability, respectively.
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6 Provability implies iterated slow provabil-
ity
In the section we will show that in some cases provability of an arithmetical
sentence in PA implies provability of the same sentence with respect to certain
transfinite iterations of some slow provability predicates.
Lemma 14 (I∆0+Exp). For all n and k we have nFωn(k)↓.
Proof. In the case of n = 0 the statment of lemma holds because Fω0(x) =
F1(x) = 2x+ 1. In the rest of the proof we consider the case of n ≥ 1.
Note that we have n(Fωn(k)↓ ↔ Fωk+1n−1
(k)↓). Thus it is enough to show
that for every α < ωn we have nFα↓. Since the theory IΣ1 proves that Fα↓
is a progressive formula (see Section 3.2) and Fα↓ is a Π2-formula, we have
1∀α ≤ ε0 (TIΠ2-α → Fα↓). Hence it is enough to show that for all α < ωn
we have nTIΠ2-α.
If n = 1 then we only need to show that for any number m we have
nTIΠ2-m. Clearly, for every m we have I∆0+Exp ⊢ TIΠ2-m→ TIΠ2-m+ 1.
Thefore for any m we have I∆0+Exp ⊢ TIΠ2-m and hence nTIΠ2-m. Thus
we will consider only the case of n ≥ 2.
In [24, Theorem 4.1] it has been shown that if 0 < m ≤ n and ω ≤ α < ε0
then I∆0 proves that TIΠn-α implies TIΠm-β for all β < ω
αω
n−m; a simple
inspection of the proof shows that that the argument could be formalized in
I∆0+Exp. Thus for all α < ωn we have 1(TIΠn-ω → TIΠ2-α). But TIΠn-ω
is just Πn-induction for natural numbers and is well-known to be equivalent
in I∆0 to Σn-induction [13, Theorem I.2.4]. Therefore for all α < ωn we have
nTIΠ2-α. ⊠
Corollary 15. Suppose Sn is a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable
theories such that PA proves that PA =
⋃
n∈ω
Sn. Let △ denote the provability
predicate Sx,Fε0 . Then PA ⊢ ∀ϕ (ϕ→ △ϕ).
Lemma 16 (IΣ1). Suppose ϕ is an arithmetical sentence and we have ϕ.
Then there exists a number n such that ⊡n2ϕ.
Proof. Because we have ϕ we also have nϕ for some n. If n < 2 then
because Fε0(1)↓, we have ⊡
1
2ϕ. Thus it remains to consider the case of n ≥ 2.
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Now we prove by induction on m > 0 that ⊡m2 Fε0(m− 1)↓. We have
Fε0(0)↓ and by Σ1-completeness of ⊡2 we have ⊡2Fε0(0)↓. Thus induc-
tion base holds. We recall that ⊡m2 satisfies Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b condi-
tions. From ⊡m2 Fε0(m− 1)↓ it follows that ⊡
m
2 ∀ψ(m+1ψ → ⊡2ψ). From
Lemma 14 we have m+1Fωm+1(m)↓, hence we have m+1Fε0(m)↓, and thus
by Σ1-completeness of ⊡
m
2 we have ⊡
m
2 m+1Fε0(m)↓. Therefore we have
⊡m2 (∀ψ(m+1ψ → ⊡2ψ)∧mFε0(m)↓) and hence ⊡
m
2 ⊡2 Fε0(m)↓. Therefore
the induction step holds.
Hence we have ⊡n−12 Fε0(n− 2)↓. Thus we have ⊡
n−1
2 ∀ψ(nψ → ⊡2ψ).
From nϕ it follows that ⊡
n−1
2 nϕ. Therefore we have ⊡
n
2ϕ. ⊠
Combining Theorem 4 and Lemma 16 we conclude that the following
theorem holds:
Theorem 5 (PA). Suppose ϕ is an arithmetical sentence. Then ϕ iff ⊡ω2ϕ.
We clearly have the following generalization:
Theorem 6. Suppose Sn is a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable
theories such that PA proves that PA =
⋃
n∈ω
Sn and IΣn+2 ⊆ Sn. Let △ denote
the provability predicate Sx,Fε0 . Then PA proves that for every arithmetical
sentence ϕ we have ϕ iff △ωϕ.
Lemma 17 (IΣ1). Suppose α < ε0 and n is a number. Then 
ωα
1 Fα(n)↓.
Proof. We use reflexive induction and hence it is sufficient to show (while
reasoning in IΣ1) that for every α ≤ ε0, if 1∀β < α ∀x
ωβ
1 Fβ(x)↓ then for
every m we have ω
α
1 Fα(m)↓.
We reason in IΣ1. Let us consider three cases: α = 0, α is a limit
ordinal, and α is a successor ordinal. In the first case we need to show that
1F0(n)↓ which is clearly true. In the second case 
ωα
1 Fα(m)↓ is equivalent
to ω
α
1 Fα[m](m)↓. The latter follows from 1
ωα[m]
1 Fα[m](m)↓ which itself
follows from 1∀β < α∀x
ωβ
1 Fβ(x)↓.
Now let us consider the case of successor α = γ+1. In order to show that
ω
γ+1
1 Fγ+1(m)↓ it is enough to show that 1
ωγ ·(m+1)
1 F
m+1
γ (m)↓. In order to
prove latter we prove by induction on k ≥ 1 that 1∀x
ωγ ·k
1 F
k
γ(x)↓ . The base
of induction follows directly from reflexive induction assumption. Suppose we
have 1∀x
ωγ ·k
1 F
k
γ(x)↓. Then we have 1
ωγ
1 ∀x
ωγ ·k
1 F
k
γ(x)↓. Using reflexive
induction assumption we obtain
1( ∀x
ωγ
1 Fγ(x)↓ ∧ 
ωγ
1 ∀x
ωγ ·k
1 F
k
γ(x)↓ ).
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Thus we have
1∀x
ωγ
1 ( Fγ(x)↓ ∧ ∀y
ωγ ·k
1 F
k
γ(y)↓ ).
Hence we have
1∀x
ωγ
1 (∃y(y = Fγ(x) ∧
ωγ ·k
1 F
k
γ(y)↓)).
Therefore
1∀x
ωγ
1 
ωγ ·k
1 F
k+1
γ (x)↓.
This finishes the proof in the successor case. ⊠
Lemma 18. Suppose Sn is a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable
theories such that PA proves that PA =
⋃
n∈ω
Sn. Let △ denote the provability
predicate Sx,Fε0 . Then PA proves that for every arithmetical sentence ϕ such
that ϕ we have △ε0ϕ.
Proof. Let us reason in PA. For some n we have Snϕ. From Lemma 17 it
follows that we have 
ωn+2
1 Fε0(n)↓. Since for some n the theory IΣ1 ⊆ Sn, in
PA the predicate △ is at least as strong as . Therefore by Lemma 10 and
Lemma 11 we have △ε0Fε0(n)↓. Hence we have △
ε0(Fε0(n)↓ ∧ Snϕ). Thus
△ε0△ϕ. Finally, by Lemma 12 we have △ε0ϕ. ⊠
7 Models for slow consistency
In this section we will show that for the slow provability predicate ⊡1, the
theory PA proves that ⊡ε01 is equivalent to . We also show that in addition
to ⊡1 a large family of provability predicates has the same property.
We will use model-theoretic techniques while reasoning in PA. We briefly
present basic definitions of formalization of model theory within arithmetic.
A model of finite signature is a tuple of formulas that give the domain, as well
as interpretations of the constant, functional, and predicate symbols. A full
model is a model with a satisfaction relation for all first-order sentences of the
signature of the model given by their Go¨del numbers. Note that for a model
without satisfaction relation there is no straightforward way to formalize in
PA whether the model satisfies some infinite set of axioms, hence when we
will talk about models of PA within PA, we will assume that the models
are full models. We will formalize our model-theoretic arguments within PA
and since full induction schema is present, our arguments will not depend
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on the complexity of formulas giving models. We also recall that Go¨del
Completeness theorem is formalizable in PA, i.e. in PA the consistency of a
theory T implies the existence of a full model of T. Also, in PA the existence
of some full model for a theory T implies the consistency of T.
For models of arithmetical theories we also consider partial satisfaction
relation that are defined only for Πn (or equivalently, Σn) formulas. Note
that if we fix a number k externally, then in PA we can construct a Πn+k
partial satisfaction relation from a Πn partial satisfaction relation. Also note
that since PA proves the Cut Elimination Theorem, it also proves that if
T is an arithmetical theory axiomatizable by a recursive set of Πn-formulas
and there is a model of T with a Πn partial satisfaction relation, then T is
consistent.
For a proper presentation of the basic definitions and the proofs of basic
theorems of model theory in formal arithmetic the reader is referred to [13,
I.4(b)].
Below we work with non-standard models of arithmetical signature, all
of them will be models of I∆0+Exp. Because standard natural numbers are
embeddable as initial segments in every model of I∆0+Exp we freely assume
that every such model contains the standard numbers.
Suppose that M is a model of I∆0+Exp. A cut I of M is a submodel of
M such that for any a ∈ M and b ∈ J, if M |= a < b, then we have a ∈ I.
For every cut I and an element a ∈M we write I < a if ∀b ∈ I (M |= b < a)
and we write a < I if a ∈ I.
Theorem 7. [24, Theorem 5.25]] Suppose n ≥ 1 is a number, α < ε0 is
an ordinal, M is a model of I∆0+Exp, and a, b, c ∈ M are non-standard
numbers such that M |= Fωωα·cn−1 (a) = b. Then there exists a cut I of M such
that a < I < b and I is a model of I∆0+Exp + TIΠn-ω
ωα.
Remark 2. It is possible to formalize Theorem 7 in PA as a theorem schema.
We assume that the model M is given by some fixed tuple of arithmetical
formulas, possibly with additional parameters. Then there are arithmetical
formulas ϕ(x, n, α, a, b, c) and ψ(y, n, α, a, b, c) such that PA proves that if
n, α, a, b, c satisfy the conditions of Theorem 7 then the set of all x from M
for which ϕ(x, n, α, a, b, c) holds is a cut I, the formula ψ(y, n, α, a, b, c) gives
a Πn partial satisfaction relation for I, and the cut I satisfies the conclusion
of Theorem 7.
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Theorem 8. ([24, Theorem 5.2]]) For all n ≥ 1 and all α, β < ε0,
I∆0+Exp + TIΠn-ω
ωα ⊢ Fβ↓ ⇐⇒ β < ω
α+1
n .
Remark 3. We will employ only ⇐ direction of Theorem 8. Examination of
the proof of [24, Lemma 5.5] shows that ⇐ direction of Theorem 8 can be
formalized in I∆0+Exp.
A result close to the following theorem goes back to Paris [19]. In the
form given below the theorem can be derived from results of Beklemishev [1,
Theorem 1, Proposition 7.3, Remark 7.4], Freund has proved this theorem
explicitely [7] for the case of α < ω.
Theorem 9. [1, 7]
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀α ∈ [1, ω](✸1α⊤ ↔ Fωα↓).
Proof. In [7] it has been proved that
IΣ1 ⊢ ∀α ∈ [1, ω)(✸1 α⊤ ↔ Fωα↓).
We need to prove that IΣ1 ⊢✸1ω⊤ ↔ Fε0↓. Clearly,
IΣ1 ⊢✸1ω⊤ ↔ ∀x✸1 x⊤
↔ ∀xFωx↓.
From Lemma 1 it follows that I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∀x Fωx↓ ↔ Fε0↓. Thus indeed
IΣ1 ⊢✸1ω⊤ ↔ Fε0↓. ⊠
Lemma 19. (PA) For every arithmetical sentence ϕ if ✸ϕ then ✸· ε01 ϕ.
Proof. We reason in PA. In order to prove our claim we consider two cases
1 ⊥ and ¬1 ⊥, i.e. ✸1 ⊤.
We start with the case of 1 ⊥. From Theorem 9 for the case of α = ω it
follows that there exists n0 such that Fε0(n0)↑ and hence Fε0(n)↑, for every
n ≥ n0. Thus for all n ≥ n0 and arithmetical sentences ψ we have ✸· 1ψ
if ✸nψ. By straightforward calculations we exclude cases n0 = 0, 1. Hence
n0 ≥ 2.
Suppose we have been given an arithmetical sentence ϕ such that ✸ϕ.
We need to show that ✸· ε01 ϕ holds. By definition ✸·
ε0
1 ϕ iff for every α < ε0
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we have ✸· 1✸·
α
1ϕ. Thus it is sufficient to show that for every α < ε0 we have
✸✸· α1ϕ.
By Completeness Theorem we have a model M of PA+ϕ. Let us consider
arbitrary n > n0. We will construct a cut In of M such that In is a model
of I∆0+Exp + TIΠ1-ωn+1 + Fε0(n)↑.
First, assume that we have already contstructed the cut In. Giving that
PA is essentially reflexive, M |= ✸nϕ. Hence because ✸nϕ is Π1 we have
In |= ✸nϕ. Combining Theorem 8, Remark 3, and Theorem 9 we see that
I∆0+Exp + TIΠ1-ωn+1 ⊢✸1 n⊤ and thus In |=✸1 n⊤.
Let us reason in I∆0+Exp+TIΠ1-ωn+1+Fε0(n)↑+✸1 n⊤+✸nϕ. We claim
that ✸n✸·
α
1ϕ, for all non-zero α < ωn+1. We prove by transfinite induction
that ✸· α1ϕ, for all non-zero α < ωn+1. The base holds because ✸· 1ϕ follows
from ✸nϕ. The limit case follows directly from definition. For the successor
case we use the fact that ✸· α1ϕ is Π1 and that IΣn is consistent with all true
Π1-sentences. Thus we obtain ✸n✸·
α
1ϕ and next ✸·
α+1
1 ϕ. This finishes the
inductive proof. In order to prove our claim we note that ✸n✸·
α
1ϕ follows
from ✸· α1ϕ since ✸·
α
1ϕ is Π1. Thus if In will have the above properties, we will
have In |= ✸n✸·
α
1ϕ, for all non-zero α < ωn+1
Now we will construct the cut In. From Theorem 3 it follows that PA ⊢
Fωn+1↓ and thus M |= Fε0(n)↓. Let us denote by u ∈ M the non-standard
number such that
M |= Fε0(n) = u.
Since Fε0(n)↓ is a Σ1-sentence, for every cut I such that I < u, we have
I |= Fε0(n)↑.
Thus it is sufficient to take as In any cut I such that I < u and
I |= I∆0+Exp + TIΠ1-ωn+1.
Let us denote by a ∈M the nonstandard number such that
M |= a = Fε0(n0) = Fω(n0+1)(n0).
We denote by b the nonstandard number such that
M |= b = Fωn·a(a).
Now we can apply Theorem 7 with c = a and obtain a cut I such that
a < I < b and I |= I∆0+Exp + TIΠ1-ωn+1.
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We claim that M |= u > b = Fωn·a(a) and thus that In < u. Clearly, for
any k < n + 1 we will get a limit ordinal by applying operation α 7−→ α[n]
exactly k times to ωn+1. Thus n + 1 is the least r such that ωn+1
r
−→
n
β + 1
for some β . We denote by β the ordinal such that ωn+1
n+1
−→
n
β + 1. Since
n > n0 ≥ 2, the ordinal β is greater than ω
2
n. Also, β is greater than ωn0+1.
Using induction we derive that ωn+1 −→
n
ω2n and ωn+1 −→
n
ωn0+1 from Lemma
2. Since β > ω2n and β > ωn0+1, we have β −→
n
ω2n and β −→
n
ωn0+1. Since
M satisfies I∆0+Exp, we can use the definition of fast-growing hierarchy to
obtain
M |= u = Fε0(n) = F
n+1
β (n).
From Lemma 1 it follows that M |= ωn−1 −→
a
0. By Lemma 4 we have M |=
ω2n−1 −→
a
ωn−1 + 1. Therefore by Lemma 2 we have M |= ω
2
n −→
a
ωωn−1+1.
Thus M |= ω2n −→
a
ωn · a. From Lemma 1 and Lemma 6 it follows that
M |= Fn+1β (n) > F
2
β(n) ≥ Fω2n(Fωn0+1(n)) ≥
Fω2n(Fωn0+1(n0)) = Fω2n(a) ≥ Fωn·a(a).
Hence we have proved our claim.
Thus for every n and α < ωn+1 we have a model of I∆0+Exp + ✸n✸·
α
1ϕ.
Thus for every n and α < ε0 we have a model of I∆0+Exp + ✸n✸·
α
1ϕ, since
for every ψ and n1 < n2 we have I∆0+Exp ⊢ ✸n2ψ → ✸n1ψ. Note that every
Π1-sentence that holds in some model of I∆0+Exp is true. Thus for every
α < ε0 and number n we have ✸n✸·
α
1ϕ. Therefore, for every α < ε0 we have
✸✸· α1ϕ. And therefore ✸·
ε0
1 ϕ.
Now assume that ✸1 ⊤. Suppose we have been given an arithmetical
sentence ϕ such that ✸ϕ. By Lo¨b’s Theorem for ✸1 we have ✸1 ¬✸1 ⊤. Thus
because ✸ϕ is Π1, we have✸1 (¬✸1 ⊤∧✸ϕ). Therefore we have ✸(¬✸1 ⊤∧✸ϕ).
Note that formalization of the first part of the proof gives us
PA ⊢ ¬✸1 ⊤ → ∀ψ(✸ψ → ∀α < ε0✸✸·
α
1ψ).
Using that we conclude that ✸(∀α < ε0✸✸·
α
1ϕ). Next we see that ∀α <
ε0✸✸·
α
1ϕ is a Π1-sentence. Therefore we have ∀α < ε0✸· 1✸·
α
1ϕ, i.e. ✸·
ε0
1 ϕ. ⊠
Using Lemma 19 and Lemma 18, we obtain the following theorem:
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Theorem 10 (PA). Suppose ϕ is a sentence and α < ε0 is a non-zero ordinal.
Then the following sentences are equivalent:
1. ϕ,
2. ⊡ε01 ϕ,
3. ⊡α1 ϕ.
Using Lemma 11 and Lemma 18 we can generalize the previous theorem
to a wider spectrum of provability predicates:
Theorem 11. Suppose Sn is a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable
theories such that PA proves that PA =
⋃
n∈ω
Sn and Sn ⊂ IΣn+1. Let △ denote
the provability predicate ε0Sx,Fε0
. Then PA proves that for every arithmetical
sentence ϕ, and non-zero ordinal α < ε0 the following sentences are equiva-
lent:
1. ϕ,
2. △ε0ϕ,
3. △αϕ.
8 Square root of PA-provability
Recall that for a recursive function f we denote by f the slowdown of
standard PA-provability predicate by the function f:
fϕ : = 0ϕ∨∃y ≤ x(yϕ∧ f(x)↓).
We are going to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 12. There exists a fast-growing recursive function r such that
PA ⊢ ∀ϕ(rrϕ↔ ϕ).
First we define the required function r and auxiliary function l. The
function r will be a function that grows faster than any Fωn , but considerably
slower than Fε0.
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Definition 7. We define function l by recursion. We give l(n) under the
assumptions that for all m < n the values l(m) are already defined:
l(n) = max({0} ∪ {m | 0 < m < n and Fωl(m)(m) ≤ n}).
We define the function r as following:
r(n) = Fωl(n)(n).
Lemma 20 (I∆0+Exp). The following holds:
1. l is total;
2. there exists n such that l(n) = 1;
3. function l is monotone-nondecreasing;
4. for every n, we have r(l(n))↓;
5. for every n, we have r(l(n)) ≤ n if l(n) ≥ 1;
6. for every n such that r(n)↓, we have l(r(n)) = n.
Proof. Straightforward using definition of l, r and Lemma 1. ⊠
Lemma 21 (IΣ1). For every n, if r(n)↓ then for all m < n we have r(m)↓
and r(m) < r(n).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1 Item 1 and easily provable fact that if Fα(n)↓
and n > m then Fα(n) > Fα(m). ⊠
Lemma 22 (IΣ1). For every arithmetical sentence ϕ, if we have ϕ then we
have rrϕ.
Proof. Suppose we have ϕ. Then there is a number n such that nϕ.
Let m = l(n). By Lemma 14 we have mFωm(n)↓. Hence directly from
the definition of r we have mr(n)↓. Thus IΣm proves that IΣn ⊆ PA↾r,
i.e. m∀ψ(nψ → rψ). By Σ1-completeness of IΣm we have mnϕ.
Combining conclusions of the last two sentences, we obtain mrϕ. By
Lemma 20 Item 4 we have r(m)↓ and therefore IΣm ⊆ PA↾r. Thus rrϕ.
⊠
30
Theorem 13. [9, Theorem 3.7] Suppose M is a non-standard model of the
theory I∆0+Exp, n ≥ 1 is a standard integer, and a, b, e ∈ M are non-
standard integers such that M |= Fωen−1(a) = b. Then there is a cut J of M
such that a < J < b and J is a model of IΣn.
Remark 4. Theorem 13 can be formalized in PA in the same fashion as The-
orem 7 in Remark 2. We assume that the model M is given by some fixed
tuple of arithmetical formulas, possibly with additional parameters. Then
there are arithmetical formulas ϕ(x, n, a, b, e) and ψ(y, n, a, b, e) such that
PA proves that if n, a, b, e satisfy the conditions of Theorem 13 then the set
of all x from M for which ϕ(x, n, a, b, e) is a cut I, the formula ψ(y, n, a, b, e)
gives a Πn partial satisfaction relation for I, and the cut I satisfies the con-
clusion of Theorem 13.
Lemma 23 (PA). For every arithmetical sentence ϕ, if ✸ϕ then ✸r✸rϕ.
Proof. Let us consider a model M of PA + ϕ. If M |= ✸rϕ then we are
already done. So we assume that M 6|= ✸rϕ. Thus there exist u ∈ M
such that M |= ✸uϕ ∧ ¬✸u+1ϕ ∧ r(u+ 1)↓. From Lemma 21 it follows that
M |= r(u)↓ and r(u) < r(u + 1). Note that u is a non-standard number
because PA is an essentially reflexive theory and thus for every standard m
we have M |= ✸mϕ.
We are going to prove that for every n such that r(n)↓ we have a cut
Jn of M such that r(u) < Jn < r(u + 1), the cut Jn have Πn satisfaction
relation, and Jn |= IΣn. If we prove our claim then for every cut Jn, we will
have PA↾
r
= IΣu within it and hence Jn |= ✸rϕ. Since every cut Jn that we
will construct will have Πn partial satisfaction relation and will be a model
of IΣn, we can conclude that ✸n✸rϕ, for every n such that r(n)↓. Hence we
will have ✸r✸rϕ, contradiction.
Now let us prove the claim. We take a, b, e ∈M:
M |= a = r(u), M |= b = Fωun−1(a), and M |= e = u
and apply Theorem 13 to construct the required cut. Now we need to check
that we indeed have r(u) < Jn < r(u + 1). For this, it is enough to show
that
M |= Fωun−1(r(u)) ≤ r(u+ 1).
Since u is a non-standard number, we have M |= r(n) < u. From Lemma
20 item 3. it follows that M |= l(u) ≥ l(r(n)). From Lemma 20 item 6. it
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follows that l(r(n)) = n. Thus M |= l(u+ 1) ≥ l(u) ≥ n. We see that
M |= r(u) = Fωl(u)(u) = Fωu+1
l(u)−1
(u)
and
M |= r(u+ 1) = Fωl(u+1)(u+ 1) = Fωu+2
l(u+1)−1
(u+ 1).
From Lemma 1 it follows that M |= ωu+2
l(u+1)−1 −→u+1
0. Now we use Lemma
5 and Lemma 4 and deduce that
M |= ωu+2
l(u+1)−1 −→u+1
ωu+2
l(u)−1 −→u+1
ωu+1
l(u)−1 + 1.
Therefore from Lemma 1 it follows that
M |= Fωu+2
l(u+1)−1
(u+ 1) ≥ Fωu+1
l(u)−1
+1(u+ 1) ≥ Fωu+1
l(u)−1
+1(u).
Now using the fact that M |= Fωu+1
l(u)−1
+1(u)↓ and Lemma 1 we conclude that
M |= ωu+1
l(u)−1 + 1 −→u
0.
Next using Corollary 5 and Lemma 5 we deduce that
M |= ωu+1
l(u)−1 −→u
ωu
l(u)−1 −→
u
ωun−1.
From Lemma 1 and Lemma 6 it follows that that
M |= Fωu+1
l(u)−1
+1(u) = F
u+1
ωu+1
l(u)−1
(u) ≥ F2
ωu+1
l(u)−1
(u) ≥ Fωun−1(Fωu+1
l(u)−1
(u)).
Therefore
M |= Fωun−1(r(u)) = Fωun−1(Fωu+1
l(u)−1
(u)) ≤ Fωu+2
l(u+1)−1
(u+ 1) = r(u+ 1).
Thus we have obtained the required cut Jn. ⊠
From Lemma 22 and Lemma 23 it follows that Theorem 12 holds.
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9 Bimodal provability logics
We determine the joint provability logic of a wide class of pairs of provability
predicates, including ordinary provability together with any of the slow prov-
ability predicates ⊡z. This result was obtained in cooperation with Volodya
Shavrukov. The relevant bimodal system is GLT, or Lindstro¨m logic, first
studied by Lindstro¨m ([15]) due to its relation to Parikh’s rule. The lat-
ter allows one to infer ϕ from PrPA(ϕ). Since Parikh’s rule is admissible in
PA, adding it to PA does not yield new theorems. As shown in [18], it does
yield speed-up, meaning that some theorems have much shorter proofs when
Parikh’s rule is allowed. The equivalence of Parikh provability and ordinary
provability is however not verifiable in PA.
In Section 9.4 we establish the joint provability logic of ordinary prov-
ability together with square root provability.
9.1 The system GLT
We work with the languages L and L△ of propositional unimodal and bi-
modal logic respectively. The symbols  and △ are thus used for the modal-
ities, not as abbreviations for arithmetical formulas as until now. As before,
✸A and ▽A are written as shorthand for ¬¬A and ¬△¬A respectively.
Definition 8. The axiom schemata of GL include all propositional tautolo-
gies in the language L, and furthermore:
(K) (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
(L) (A→ A)→ A
The inference rules of GL are modus ponens and necessitation: if ⊢GL A then
⊢GL A.
Lemma 24. ⊢GL A→ A
Proof. See [2, Theorem 1.18]. ⊠
A relation ≺ on a set W is said to be conversely well-founded if for every
S ⊆ W with S 6= ∅, there is some a ∈ W such that a ⊀ b for all b ∈ S. A
conversely well-founded relation is, in particular, irreflexive. We write a  b
if either a ≺ b or a = b.
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Definition 9. A GL-frame F is a tuple 〈W,≺〉, where ≺ is a transitive
conversely well-founded relation on W . F is said to be tree-like if there is a
root r ∈ W such that for all a ∈ W , r  a, and furthermore each a 6= r has
a unique immediate ≺-predecessor b.
Definition 10. A GL-model is a triple 〈W,≺,〉, where 〈W,≺〉 is a GL-
frame, and  a valuation assigning to every propositional letter a subset of
W .  is extended to all formulas of L by requiring that it commutes with
the propositional connectives, and interpreting ≺ as the accessibility relation
for :
M, a  A if for all b with a ≺ b, b  A.
Given M = 〈W,≺,〉, we write M  A if M, a  A for every a ∈ W .
We write F  A if M  A for any model M whose underlying frame is F .
Theorem 14. ⊢GL A iff for every tree-like GL-frame F , F  A.
Proof. See for example Chapter 5 of [2]. ⊠
Definition 11. The axiom schemata of GLT include all propositional tau-
tologies in the language L△, the rules and axiom schemata of GL for △, as
well as:
(K) (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
(T1) △A→ A
(T2) A→ △A
(T3) A→ △A
(T4) △A→ A
It is not difficult to show that ⊢GLT (A → A) → A. Thus GLT
contains GL for both △ and .
Given a tree-like GL-frame 〈W,≺〉 and a, b ∈ W , we write a ≺∞ b if the
set {c | a ≺ c ≺ b} is infinite. It is shown in [15] that GLT is sound and
complete with respect to the class all of tree-like GL-frames, with ≺ and
≺∞ as the accessibility relations for △ and  respectively. We consider a
slightly different semantics for GLT that — while arguably less neat than
the one just described — has the advantage of allowing us to work with
finite models. Indeed, it was introduced by Lindstro¨m in order to obtain
decidability of GLT.
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Definition 12. For A ∈ L△, an A-sound model is a quadruple 〈W,≺,≺R
,〉, where
1. 〈W,≺〉 is a finite tree-like GL-frame
2. a ≺R b ⇒ a ≺ b
3. a ≺ b ≺R c ⇒ a ≺R c
4. a ≺R b ≺ c ⇒ a ≺R c
5. if a ≺R b, there is some c with a ≺R c  b, and such that c  △B → B
for every subformula B of A. Such a node c shall be referred to as
reflexive.
Finally,  is a valuation satisfying the usual clauses, with ≺ and ≺R as the
accessibility relations for △ and  respectively.
Lemma 25. [15, Lemma 9] Let n be the cardinality of the set of subformulas
of A. ⊢GLT A iff M  A for every A-sound model of cardinality ≤ n
n2+1.
9.2 Arithmetical interpretations of modal logic
In order to formulate the connection between GLT and our arithmetical prov-
ability predicates, we use the notion of an arithmetical realization.
Definition 13. Let Pr0 and Pr1 be provability predicates in the language L of
arithmetic. An arithmetical realization ∗ is an assignment of L-sentences to
all modal formulas. The values of ∗ at propositional letters of the modal lan-
guage can be arbitrary. It is required that ∗ commutes with the propositional
connectives, and furthermore (A)∗ := Pr0(pA
∗q) and (△A)∗ = Pr1(pA
∗q).
We note that the values of an arithmetical realization ∗ are determined
by its values at the propositional letters of L△.
Definition 14. Let Pr0 and Pr1 be provability predicates for a theory T
containing I∆0+Exp. We say that GL (GLT) is sound for Pr0 (and Pr1) if:
⊢GL(GLT) A ⇒ T ⊢ A
∗ for all arithmetical realizations ∗ .
We say that GL (GLT) is complete for Pr0 (and Pr1) if:
T ⊢ A∗ for all arithmetical realizations ∗ ⇒ ⊢GL(GLT) A.
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If GL (GLT) is both sound and complete with respect to Pr0 (and Pr1), we
say that GL (GLT) is the provability logic of Pr0 (and Pr1). This means that
GL (GLT) contains exactly those principles of provability in T — as given by
Pr0 and Pr1 respectively — that can be verified in I∆0+Exp.
Theorem 15. Let T ⊇ I∆0+Exp be recursively axiomatizable and Σ1-sound.
Then GL is the provability logic of PrT.
Proof. The case where T = PA was proven by Solovay in [23]. Extension to
Σ1-sound recursively axiomatizable theories containing I∆0+Exp is due to
de Jongh, Jumelet, and Montagna in [3]. ⊠
Throughout the rest of this section, we use the symbols  and △ for both
provability predicates and modalities. Since lower-case Greek letters range
over arithmetical and upper-case Latin letters over modal sentences, the in-
tended meaning will always be clear from the context. With this notation,
we also imply that we are interested in arithmetical realizations interpreting
the modalities △ and  as the corresponding provability predicates. Bear-
ing this in mind we shall, from now on, mostly skip referring to the explicit
formalization of Definition 13.
9.3 Arithmetical soundness and completeness
We prove the following arithmetical completeness theorem.
Theorem 16. Let  and△ be Σ1-provability predicates numerating the same
sound theory T extending I∆0+Exp, i.e. for all ϕ,
1. T ⊢ ϕ if and only if I∆0+Exp ⊢ ϕ
2. N  ϕ↔△ϕ, where N is the standard model
Assume furthermore that GLT is sound for  and △. Then GLT is also
complete for  and △.
Remark 5. With the above interpretation of , we depart from the conven-
tion that  stands for the ordinary provability predicate of PA.
Lemma 26. Let {Sn}n∈ω be a recursive sequence of finitely axiomatizable
theories such that PA proves PA =
⋃
n∈ω Sn. Write △ for Sx,Fε0 , and  for
the usual provability predicate of PA. Then PA verifies the following, for all
ϕ:
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1. △ϕ→ ϕ
2. ϕ→△ϕ
3. ϕ→ △ϕ
4. △ϕ→ ϕ
Proof. Item 1 is clear from the definition, item 2 follows by provable Σ1-
completeness of △, 3 is Corollary 15 in Section 6, and 4 is Theorem 4 in
Section 5. ⊠
By Remark 1 in Section 5, it follows that the requirements of Theorem 16
are satisfied when taking for  the usual provability predicate of PA, and for
△ any of the slow provability predicates ⊡z. We note that the requirements
of Theorem 16 are also satisfied when taking for △ the usual provability
predicate of PA, and for  the provability predicate for PA together with
Parikh’s rule1.
We assume all Σ1-sentences to be of the form ∃y ψ, with ψ a ∆0-formula.
If ϕ is a Σ1-sentence, we write n : ϕ to mean that n is a witness for ϕ, i.e. if
ψ(n) holds. We also assume:
1. if n : ϕ, then for any ψ 6= ϕ it is not the case that n : ψ
2. if there is some n with n : ϕ, then there are arbitrarily large n′ with
n′ : ϕ
The above requirements hold for any reasonable arithmetization of syntax in
arithmetic. For every Σ1-formula ϕ, there exists a formula ∃y ψ satisfying 1
and 2 that is I∆0+Exp-provably equivalent to ϕ; thus the above assumption
does not restrict us in any way.
Let T,  and△ be as in the statement of Theorem 16. Our proof of arith-
metical completeness proceeds, as usual, by constructing a suitable Solovay
function moving along the accessibility relations of a GLT-model. For the
remainder of this section, fix some A-sound model M = 〈W,≺,≺R,〉. We
1Lindstro¨m’s proof of arithmetical completeness of GLT with respect to ordinary
provability  and Parikh provability p made essential use of the fact that PA ⊢
∀ϕ (pϕ↔ ωϕ). While, as follows from the results of Section 6, the same relation holds
between  and ⊡2, it fails for  and ⊡1, where we only have PA ⊢ ∀ϕ (ϕ↔ ⊡
ε0
1
ϕ). Our
proof method does not rely on △ being a certain ordinal iteration of , and is therefore
applicable to a wider class of predicates.
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assume that M has a root, i.e. that there is a node 0 ∈ W such that 0 ≺ a
for every 0 6= a ∈ W . We also assume as given L-formulas representing M
in I∆0+Exp in a natural way.
Definition 15. (I∆0+Exp) Define the primitive recursive function h : ω →
W :
h(0) = 0
h(n+ 1) =


b if h(n) ≺R b, b is reflexive, and n : L 6= b, else:
c if h(n) ≺ c and n : △L 6= c
h(n) otherwise
For a ∈ W , L = a is the formula expressing that a is the limit of h. As
usual, the apparent circularity in the definition of h is dealt with by using
the Diagonal Lemma (see [23] or [2]).
The function h starts at the root 0, and moves along the relations ≺ and
≺R. It makes an ≺R-step to some node b only if there is a -proof that
it will not stay there, and it makes an ≺-step to some node c only if there
is a △-proof that it will not stay there. We refer to the elements of the
domain of h as stages, saying for example that h moved to a at stage n if
h(n− 1) 6= h(n) = a.
Lemma 27. (I∆0+Exp) h has a unique limit.
Proof. Since a ≺R b implies a ≺ b, it is clear from the definition that h
moves along the ≺-relation in M. Since ≺ is transitive, we thus have that
h(x)  h(y) whenever x < y. If h were to keep moving forever, there would
be an infinite ascending ≺-chain in M, contradicting the assumption that
〈W,≺〉 is a GL-frame. ⊠
Let ϕh(x, y) be an L-formula representing h in I∆0+Exp in a natural way.
According to Lemma 27,
I∆0+Exp ⊢ ∃!y ∃x0∀x ≥ x0 ϕh(x, y). (32)
In the remainder of this section, we work in a definitional expansion of
I∆0+Exp that contains a term L denoting the limit of h. We note that by
(32) such a definitional expansion is a conservative extension of I∆0+Exp.
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Lemma 28. (I∆0+Exp) If h(n) = a, then a  L.
Proof. If h(n) = a, then either h stays at a, i.e. we have L = a, or it moves
away from h, in which case all its further values are ≺-successors of a, and
so a ≺ L (as in the proof of Lemma 27). ⊠
Lemma 29. (I∆0+Exp) If L = a and a ≺ b, then ▽L = b.
Proof. Assume L = a and a ≺ b, and let t be such that ∀x ≥ t h(x) = a.
Suppose for a contradiction that △L 6= b holds. Then there also exists some
some n ≥ t with n : △L 6= b. But this means that h moves away from a to b
at stage n, contradicting our assumption that L = a. ⊠
Lemma 30. (I∆0+Exp) If L = a and a ≺R b, then ✸L = b.
Proof. Assume L = a and a ≺R b. By properties of M, there exists some
reflexive c with a ≺R c and c  b. Arguing as in the proof of Lemma 29, we
have that ✸L = c. If c = b, we are done. If c ≺ b, we have L = c→▽L = b
by Lemma 29, whence also
✸L = c→ ✸▽L = b
by modal reasoning, using the soundness of GL for . An application of
modus ponens yields ✸▽L = b, and therefore ✸L = b by principle T3 of
GLT. ⊠
Lemma 31. (I∆0+Exp) If L = a, then △ a  L.
Proof. From L = a it follows that h(n) = a for some n. By Σ1-completeness
of △,
△h(n˙) = a
Since the theory defined by △ contains I∆0+Exp, Lemma 28 gives us
△ (h(n˙) = a→ a  L) .
Combining the above yields △ a  L as required. ⊠
Lemma 32. (I∆0+Exp) If a 6= 0 is not reflexive, then L = a implies △ a ≺
L.
Proof. If the limit of h is some irreflexive a 6= 0, then h must have moved
to a due to some number witnessing △L 6= a. By lemma 31, we also have
△ a  L. Combining these, we get △ a ≺ L. ⊠
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Lemma 33. (PA) If a 6= 0, then L = a implies  a ≺R L.
Proof. Assume L = a. By Lemma 31, we have △ a  L, whence also  a 
L. Since a 6= 0 and h moved to a, it must be that L 6= a. It therefore
suffices to show that if b is such that a ≺ b but a ⊀R b, then L 6= b. We
assume that the claim has been established for all b′ with a ≺ b′ ≺ b, i.e. that
we have L 6= b′ for all such b′.
Since L = a 6= 0, h must have moved to a at some stage t. Then either
L 6= a or △L 6= a holds, but in either case L 6= a. Argue in :
We have h(t) = a, L 6= a, and L 6= b′ for all b′ with a ≺ b′ ≺ b. Thus
h has to eventually move away from any node in {a} ∪ {b′ | a ≺ b′ ≺ b}.
Consider the first stage where this happens, i.e. let s > t be minimal with
h(s) /∈ {a} ∪ {b′ | a ≺ b′ ≺ b}, and let c = h(s). Since h(t) = a and t < s, we
have a ≺ c. We consider two cases:
1. c = b: the reason for moving could only have been that s−1 : △L 6= b.
If the move had been due to the first clause of Definition 15, we would
have a ≺ c ≺R b, and so a ≺R b by properties of M, contradicting our
assumption that a ⊀R b.
2. c 6= b: by the proof of Lemma 31, h(s) = c implies △ c  L. Our choice
of c excludes c ≺ b, and we have assumed c 6= b. Thus △L 6= b also in
this case.
Returning to the outside world, we have shown that △L 6= b. With
principle T4, we obtain L 6= b as desired. ⊠
Lemma 34. Let N be the standard model. Then
1. N  L = 0
2. for any a ∈ W , the sentence L = a is consistent with T
Proof. By Lemma 27 (and soundness of I∆0+Exp), N  L = a holds for some
a. If a 6= 0, then either N  L 6= a or N  △L 6= a, depending on how
h moved to a. Since  and △ have the same extension in N, we have
N  L 6= a in both cases, and thus T ⊢ L 6= a. By soundness of T, we get
N  L 6= a, contradicting our assumption. Thus it must be that a = 0. For 2,
note that by Lemma 29 (and soundness of I∆0+Exp) N  L = 0→▽L = a
holds for all a ∈ W . Since N  L = 0, it follows that N  ▽L = a,
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i.e. N  ¬△L 6= a for any a ∈ W . Suppose that T ⊢ L 6= a. Then
N  L 6= a and thus also N  △L 6= a, a contradiction. Thus we conclude
that T 0 L 6= a. ⊠
Lemma 35. Define the arithmetical realization ∗ by:
p∗ :=
∨
M,ap
L = a. (33)
Then for every subformula B of A, and every a ∈M, a 6= 0
M, a  B ⇒ T ⊢ L = a→ B∗. (34)
Proof. This is proven in the standard manner by induction on the complexity
of B, using Lemmas 27-33 (see e.g. [23] or [2]). We treat the only slightly
deviant case of △B. Assume a  △B, i.e. b  B for all b with a ≺ b. By the
induction assumption, we have T ⊢ L = b→ B∗ for all such b, and thus
T ⊢ a ≺ L→ B∗. (35)
By modal reasoning, this implies
T ⊢ △a ≺ L→△B∗. (36)
Now argue in T, assuming L = a. If a is irreflexive, then L = a implies
△a ≺ L by Lemma 32, and so △B∗ by (36). If a is reflexive, then we have
a  B, whence the induction assumption additionally gives L = a → B∗,
and therefore a  L → B∗ and △a  L → △B∗. With Lemma 31, L = a
implies △a  L, thus we obtain △B∗ also in this case. ⊠
We are now ready to combine the results of this section to prove Theorem
16.
Proof. We need to show that if 0GLT A, there is some arithmetical realization
∗ with T 0 A∗. Suppose that GLT 0 A. By Lemma 25, letM be an A-sound
model withM, w 1 A for some w ∈ M. We append a root 0 toM, and apply
Definition 15 to the resulting model. By Lemma 35, T ⊢ L = w → ¬A∗.
Therefore, since T 0 L 6= w by Lemma 34, it must be that T 0 A∗. ⊠
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9.4 Square root provability
We conclude with a characterization of the provability logic of square root
and ordinary provability. In Section 8, it was shown that there is a provability
predicate r such that
PA ⊢ ∀ϕ (rrϕ↔ ϕ) , (37)
where  denotes the usual provability predicate of PA. By Theorem 15,
r satisfies the Hilbert-Bernays-Lo¨b derivability conditions (verifiably in
I∆0+Exp). As we will see, the equivalence in (37) is in fact sufficient for
obtaining all propositional schemata concerning  and r that are provable
in PA. In the remainder of this section, we shall introduce the bimodal logic
GL2, and sketch the proof of its arithmetical completeness with respect to 
and r.
Definition 16. The axiom schemata of GL2 include all propositional tau-
tologies in the language L△, the rules and axioms of GL for △, as well
as:
(2) A↔△△A
Given a tree-like GL-frame 〈W,≺〉 and a, b ∈ W , write a ≺2 b if there is
some c with a ≺ c ≺ b.
Lemma 36. GL2 is sound and complete with respect to the class of tree-
like GL-frames, with ≺ and ≺2 as the accessibility relations for △ and 
respectively.
Proof. Easy exercise. ⊠
It is proven in [26, Section 7] that GL2 is the joint provability logic of
I∆0+Exp-provability and cut-free provability in I∆0+Exp.
Theorem 17. GL2 is the provability logic of r and .
Proof. Suppose that 0GL2 A. By Lemma 36, there is a GL2 model M =
〈W,≺,〉 with M 1 A. By applying the usual Solovay construction for GL,
we find for all a ∈M a statement L = a in the language of arithmetic, such
that for all modal sentences B not containing any occurrences of :
a  B ⇒ PA ⊢ L = a→ B∗, (38)
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where ∗ is an arithmetical realization2 mapping the modality △ to square
root provability, i.e. to r. Now, using thatM  △△B ↔ B on the modal
side, and PA ⊢ rrB
∗ ↔ B∗ on the arithmetical side, it is easy to check
that (38) can be extended to all B ∈ L△ (with ∗ mapping  to ordinary
provability). Using this, PA 0 A∗ follows by the usual argument. ⊠
10 Open Problems
1. In the present paper we have shown that there exist two large groups of
slow provability predicates of the form Sn,Fε0 : the predicates that are
ω-“roots” and ε0-“roots” of the ordinary provability in PA. For which
ordinals α ∈ (ω, ε0) there exist sequence Sn such that PA proves that
and
⋃
n∈ω
Sn = PA and for every ϕ we have 
α
Sn,Fε0
ϕ↔ ϕ?
2. In theorems 12 , 6, and 11 we have established a correspondence be-
tween ordinary and slow provability. One could also considered slow
variants of n . Would the analogues of the mentioned theorem holds
for n and its slow variant?
3. In Section 9 we have proved that Lindstro¨m Logic is the provability
logic of pairs of provability predicates from a rather large family. One
could easily generalize Lindstro¨m logic to a polymodal case with lin-
early ordered family of modal connectives by stating all the copies of
axioms of Lindstro¨m logic, where △ correspond to a modality with
a smaller index and  to a modality with larger index. Would the
analogous of Theorem 16 holds for this logics?
4. It is easy to see that any pair of provability predicates of the form
(△,△α), where α ≥ ω satisfy the conditions of Theorem 16. Is it
true that for every pair of provability predicates (△,) that satisfy
conditions of Theorem 16 we can find elementary well-ordering and α
from it such that  is equivalent to △α?
5. For which natural n > 2 there exist a recursive f such that PA proves
that for every ϕ we have n
f
ϕ↔ ϕ?
2p∗ is defined to be
∨
M,ap L = a. For more details, see [23], or the proof of Theorem
16 in the previous section.
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